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European Central Bank working paper series 56Abstract:
We revisit recent evidence on how monetary policy affects output and prices in the U.S.
and in the euro area. The response patterns to a shift in monetary policy are similar in
most respects, but differ noticeably as to the composition of output changes. In the euro
area investment is the predominant driver of output changes, while in the U.S.
consumption shifts are significantly more important. We dub this difference the output
composition puzzle and explore its implications and several potential explanations for it.
While the evidence seems to point at differences in consumption responses, rather than
investment, as the proximate cause for this fact, the source of the consumption difference
remains a puzzle.
JEL Codes: E21, E22, E30, E52
Key words: monetary policy transmission, business cycles, consumption, investment
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A consensus has emerged during the last twenty years that changes in monetary policy trigger a
humped-shaped output response; prices react with some delay, and eventually settle down to a
new level. Much of this consensus is based on the examination of the U.S. experience and a
natural question is whether the consensus view on the monetary transmission mechanism holds
for the euro area as well. A comparative understanding of the two transmission mechanisms can
sharpen our understanding of each.
We proceed in steps. We first compare the cyclical properties of United States and euro area
macroeconomic time series. Here the striking fact, already reported by other recent papers, is that
such properties are in fact broadly alike, suggesting that similar underlying shocks   and
transmission processes govern the business cycle of the two monetary unions.
We then focus on the effects of monetary policy shocks on output and prices. We describe the
monetary policy transmission in the two areas using several econometric techniques, including
both large scale econometric models and VARs, with the aim to identify features that are robust
across different techniques. In the case of the euro area, we also compare the results obtained with
area wide models with those resulting from country level models.
Again, we find many similarities. In particular, the established consensus for the U.S. seems to
hold for the euro area as well. Specifically, after a monetary shock, real GDP displays a humped-
shaped profile, returning to baseline, whereas the price level diverges gradually but permanently
from the initial value. These patterns of output and price responses can also be observed for the
individual countries that adopted the euro.
There are however also important differences. Prior work has paid relatively little attention to the
underlying adjustments that accompany the change in output. In this respect the two areas differ.
In particular, after a change in monetary policy the role of household consumption in driving
output changes is greater, and that of investment smaller, in the U.S. relative to the euro area. We
dub these differences the “output composition puzzle”.
We check that the differences in the output composition are confirmed when measured using
different statistical techniques. Indeed, we devise a synthetic measure of the output composition
that can be more easily compared across monetary unions or countries and across alternative
monetary policy experiments. We find that statistical testing of the differences clearly establish
the robustness of the output composition puzzle.
We then provide tentative interpretations and explanations for it. We analyse the puzzle in the
class of tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that have recently been
proposed as an accurate description of the monetary policy transmission. The idea is to trace the
differences in output composition to differences in “deep” parameters characterizing the two
economies. We verify that these models, in their current estimated (or calibrated) version, have
trouble fully accounting for the differences in the composition of output adjustments that we
observe in the data.
Abandoning the straightjacket of the DSGE models, that assume the existence of perfect
insurance opportunities, we are naturally led to ask whether differences in the availability of
insurance against employment and income risk might be responsible for the differences in the
output composition. The evidence is ambiguous, but there are some hints that more complete
social insurance in the euro area might play a role in resolving our puzzle. Overall, we tentatively
attribute the origin of the puzzle to differences in the behavior of consumers rather than in the
behavior of firms (through their investment decisions).
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A consensus has emerged during the last twenty years, over the way that the actions of
central banks affect the economy (the monetary transmission mechanism). In a nutshell,
changes in monetary policy have a persistent, though not permanent, effect on output,
with the output change being humped-shaped; prices react with some delay, and
eventually settle down to a new level, with no permanent effect on inflation. 
Much of this consensus is based on the examination of the U.S. experience. Yet, recently,
twelve European countries embarked upon an unprecedented grand monetary experiment.
A new central bank was created from scratch and the currencies of twelve sovereign
nations were replaced with the euro. A natural question is whether the consensus view on
the monetary transmission mechanism holds for the euro area as well.
While we expect this question will be the subject of intense research in the future, some
first answers were provided by a momentous research effort involving the staffs of the
European Central Bank (ECB) and of the twelve national central banks (NCB) forming
the euro area (Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003). Some surprising similarities were
found, together with some interesting differences. 
In this paper, drawing from that body of work, we first check the robustness of the
similarities. These are important because, as the euro area is only about five years old,
any time series analysis of the euro area transmission necessarily uses mostly data from
the previous monetary policy regime. This confounds analyses based on either synthetic
data of euro area aggregates or the aggregation of country-level findings.  However, some
of the uncertainty over the transmission mechanism may be reduced if the time series
facts that can be compiled for the euro area resemble those for the U.S., a long
functioning monetary union of similar size and openness as the euro area.  
The bulk of our analysis will focus on an intriguing difference between the two currency
areas. In particular, we call attention to one aspect of the transmission mechanism that
has previously received little attention: the composition of the output adjustments that
follow a change in monetary policy. Along this dimension, an interesting contrast
emerges between the euro area findings and those for the U.S. In the U.S. changes in
consumption spending appear to be a much more important component of monetary
adjustment than in the euro area (where investment spending changes appear to be pre-
eminent). We dub this difference the output composition puzzle.
We see the motivation for studying the composition of the output response as threefold.
First, better understanding the composition effects can improve the central bank’s ability
to monitor the economy. For instance, knowledge that consumption adjustments are
typically dominant in the U.S. would suggest that consumer behavior is what needs to be
watched carefully to see whether policy changes are working through the economy in the
expected way. This ultimately would help determining whether the current monetary
stance is appropriate or policy changes are called for.
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understanding of the factors behind the monetary transmission mechanism. As will be
discussed later on, the differences between a dominant consumption response in the U.S.
and a dominant investment response in the euro area could be due to a variety of
institutional or legal constraints, or frictions, linked for example to the structure of
financial or labor markets, or differences in the levels of social insurance. Better
understanding the composition seems a useful first step to uncover the relevance of these
different factors. Moreover, having identified the relevant factors one could then discuss
whether structural policies, e.g. in the financial or labor markets, might be warranted to
alter these institutions.  
A third, and closely related, consideration is that this analysis can be informative about
the stability of the transmission mechanism. By understanding which transmission
channels are dominant and which are dormant, one can decide which changes to the
economy merit most attention. For instance, if the consumption response in the U.S. is
dominant a policymaker might conclude that paying close attention to changes in the
mortgage markets is more important than studying changes in the tax treatment of
depreciation. 
We organize the paper into three parts. We begin with a brief review of the stylized facts
about the basic statistical properties of the data and on the transmission mechanisms for
the U.S. and euro area, showing a number of similarities. 
In the next section we document the output composition puzzle, arguing that it is a robust
feature of the two economies that can be confirmed using a host of statistical techniques
and data. 
In the following section, we provide tentative interpretations and explanations for it. We
first explore the puzzle in the class of tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models that have recently been proposed as an accurate description of the
monetary policy transmission (prominent examples are Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2001) for the U.S. and Smets and Wouters (2002) for the euro area). The idea is to
trace the differences in output composition to differences in “deep” parameters
characterizing the two economies. We verify that these models, in their current estimated
(or calibrated) version, have trouble fully accounting for the differences in the
composition of output adjustments that we observe in the data. 
To do this we identify the mechanisms in the model that give rise to differences in the
output composition, isolating a small subset of the models’ parameters that essentially
govern the output composition. The differences estimated for these parameters are
however too small, and sometimes even of the wrong sign, to fully account for the
differences in the output composition between the two areas. Moreover, the mechanisms
identified do not appear to be very powerful. It appears that large changes in these
parameters are needed to bring the models in line with our data-based estimates of the
consumption contributions to output adjustment. 
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these problems and account for the output composition puzzle is an issue that we leave
for future research. For now, they provide us with a structural (although partial)
interpretation of the uncovered differences that can be subject to independent scrutiny.
Most importantly, revealing that some potential mechanisms are not enough to account
for the puzzle helps direct the search for other mechanisms, so far not included in these
models. 
We move in this direction in the final section of the paper. There, departing from the
maintained assumption in the DSGE models that agents are fully insured against various
shocks, we explore differences in employment and income risk to see whether the lack of
these kinds of insurance might be responsible for the differences. The evidence is
ambiguous but there are some hints that more complete social insurance in the euro area
might play a role in resolving our puzzle. Overall, we tentatively attribute the origin of
the puzzle to differences in the behavior of consumers rather than in the behavior of firms
(through their investment decisions). 
2. Basic Facts on Monetary Transmission in the U.S. and euro area
A vast literature of the monetary transmission mechanism exists, with excellent, recent
surveys provided by the papers in the 1995 symposium in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives (Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Taylor (1995), Meltzer (1995), Obsfeld and
Rogoff (1995)), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), Mankiw (2001) and Bean,
Larsen and Nikolov (2003). Rather than rehashing the evidence reviewed in these papers,
we will focus on whether the long U.S. expansion in the 1990s has changed anything and
compare the latest U.S. results to some recent findings for the euro area. As they are
relatively less known, we will start by taking a look at the euro area data.
2.1 Introduction to the euro area data
One major challenge in analyzing the transmission mechanism in the euro area is the data
difficulties. The euro area has only had a single monetary policy for about five years. So
time series analysis of macroeconomic variables during this time period is not feasible. 
Combining the post-ECB data with historical data is also difficult. For one thing, many
countries that now use the euro do not have full quarterly data on many relevant macro
series. For example, quarterly data for inventory investment and durable consumption are
simply not available for most countries. Furthermore, quarterly euro area trade figures net
of trade flows within the euro area are only available from 1992 onwards. Thus, there are
certain questions that cannot even be considered. 
More fundamentally, it is legitimate to question whether aggregating the country data for
the euro area countries prior to the adoption of the euro even makes sense. This was
obviously not a single economy with a common monetary policy prior to 1999, though
the transition to the single currency and the likely ensuing changes in agents’ behavior
were gradual. So one might prefer to analyze the member countries separately and then
aggregate the findings to the euro area level. 
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country level. Second, we are chiefly interested in how the member countries would
respond to common monetary actions. Given that in the historical sample there was no
common monetary policy, we will need to adjust the country level results anyway (for
instance, by imposing a common monetary reaction function in the analysis).
Recognizing these problems, we analyze both the synthetic data for the euro area and
country level evidence.
1 
We begin by reporting some summary descriptive material on the euro area data. Table 1,
reproduced from Agresti and Mojon (2003), presents a set of descriptive statistics for the
(de-trended) euro area data along with similar statistics for the U.S., which serves as a
benchmark. The euro area data are only available from 1970 onwards, so for comparison
purposes we show findings for both regions from this date through 2000 – in later
sections we take advantage of earlier U.S. data where available.
Three main features of these results stand out. First, the absolute level of the volatility of
GDP in the euro area is lower than in the U.S.
2 Second, if measured relative to GDP, the
volatility of the main domestic demand components appear to be broadly similar in the
two economies; of relevance for our later findings is the fact that the relative volatilities
of consumption and investment are similar in both currency areas. This does not appear
to be true for inflation (as measured by consumer price indices), whose volatility appears
to be much lower in the euro area. 
Third, the dynamic cross and auto-correlations between the main macro variables display
many striking similarities across the two economies. For instance, the serial correlation
properties of GDP and the price deflators, as well as the lead-lag patterns of the cross-
correlations between GDP and its components, interest rates and credit aggregates are all
broadly similar. 
There are also several differences. The one that we find most intriguing is that stock
prices appear to be strongly positively correlated with future output in the U.S., contrary
to what is found for the euro area. This could result from the small size of the stock
market in continental Europe over most of the sample period. We do not have obvious
explanations for the other dissimilarities.
3 
 
                                                
1 The euro area data used in this study are taken from Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001). Updates of these
data along with a number of other statistical data on the euro area real and financial sectors are available at
the ECB website, www.ecb.int.
2 In this context it should be noted, however, that the volatility of U.S. GDP has declined over time. See
Stock and Watson (2003) for a survey, and Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2002), Kahn, McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2002), Boivin and Giannoni (2002), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), and Ramey and Vine (2003)
competing explanations of this reduction in macroeconomic instability.
3 For instance, we do not have interpretations for the following findings: 1) that the correlation between
past GDP and current inflation tends to be lower in the euro area; 2) that the sign of the correlation between
current inflation and future GDP growth quickly becomes negative in the U.S., while it remains positive in
the euro area; 3) that M1 seems a better leading indicator of output in the euro area than in the U.S.; and 4)
that real estate prices exhibit very different lead and lag correlations with GDP in the two economies.
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As noted earlier, we will use the phrase monetary transmission mechanism to describe the
effects of a change in the stance of monetary policy on real quantities and prices. In some
cases we will cite evidence from vector autoregressions (VARs) that have the
interpretation of the response of different variables to an unanticipated shock to the
implicit central bank reaction function. In other cases we will refer to evidence embodied
in traditional macroeconometric models maintained in the central banks. We recognize
that, depending on one’s preferred theory of monetary non-neutrality, one or another of
the various pieces of evidence would be regarded as more relevant. We believe, however,
that there is unfortunately not sufficient consensus over which model of non-neutrality is
correct (or even most correct), and hence believe that a dogmatic approach of ruling out
certain types of evidence would be unwise. 
Our first set of evidence looks at VARs, drawing from previous research. We update
these specifications to include current data (to see if that matters). For each area we
consider three models. We first review the U.S. models and their results and then do the
same for the euro area.
The first U.S. VAR follows the recursive identification procedure proposed by
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) that has become the benchmark in this
literature. We analyze the variant proposed by Erceg and Levin (2002) that was designed
to provide information on the composition of output responses to monetary shocks.
Because of this focus Erceg and Levin modified the Christiano et al. specification to
include different components of GDP whose interest rate sensitivities might be expected
to differ. Consequently their model includes GDP and a host of demand components,
along with a price deflator, a commodity price index and the federal funds rate. 
We depart from this by including only investment and consumption, and using a slightly
different commodity price series and the consumer price index (CPI) instead of the GDP
deflator.
4 We limit the demand components to consumption and investment because for
the euro area we do not have the further disaggregated data anyway (and we favor
treating both areas symmetrically). But even with this crude separation we can study the
composition of the adjustment that underlies the output responses. Given this aim we also
replace GDP with GDP less the sum of consumption and investment (i.e. by net exports
and government spending, which we call “the rest of GDP” henceforth). This substitution
provides us with a parsimonious way to show both the total GDP response to monetary
shocks (obtained as the sum of the responses of consumption, investment and the rest)
and its composition. Moreover, this procedure can be interpreted as a quick way to
impose in the VAR the constraint provided by the national accounting identity, of the
type usually imposed in traditional macroeconometric models. As our choice does not
lead to overall GDP responses to monetary shocks that differ from previous findings, we
                                                
4 There is no single commodity price series that is universally used in this literature. Our findings suggest
that the choice of the series makes little difference to the estimated impulse responses, although whether the
series is smoothed or not makes a slight difference in reducing the size of the “price puzzle” discussed
below. 
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make this same substitution in all of the other VARs. 
For our consumption series we use private consumption, i.e. the sum of non-durable
goods, services and durable goods consumption. For investment we use total private
sector investment. These aggregates are the closest match for GDP components that are
available for the euro area: private consumption and private investment.
5
Our baseline estimation period for the U.S. sample begins the first quarter of 1960 and
ends in 2001 quarter 4 – the starting date is given by the availability of the official data
for the money supply figures and the ending date by the last quarter with data that were
not preliminary as of the time when we began the analysis. However, we also consider
another sub-sample that runs from 1965 to 2001 quarter 4, but omits the data from the
fourth quarter of 1979 until the fourth quarter of 1983.
6 The 1965 start-date is chosen
because this is when the market for federal funds began to operate in its current format.
The excluded period covers the interval when the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures
changed to emphasize the importance of non-borrowed reserves. Finally, we also look at
a sample that runs from 1984 to the 2001 quarter 4. This covers the most recent part of
the sample only and spans the period during which the operating procedures were
relatively stable. The models are estimated with 4 lags for the first two samples and, in
order to preserve degrees of freedom, with 2 lags for the 1984-2001 sample.
Our second model is based on an identification procedure proposed by Gordon and
Leeper (1994). Their model adds a long-term (ten-year) interest rate and M2 to the list of
variables examined by Erceg and Levin. Gordon and Leeper opt for an alternative set of
identifying restrictions that focus on the information set that the central bank could be
expected to have at the time when it was setting the short-term interest rate. Accordingly,
they do not allow contemporaneous data on inflation and GDP to influence this decision
– leaving only contemporaneous commodity prices, the long term interest rate and M2 as
potentially affecting the contemporaneous Federal funds rate. In contrast,
contemporaneous prices and GDP components enter the money demand equation. Our
decomposition of the demand components leads naturally to modifying this identification
strategy by assuming that the innovations of consumption, investment and the rest of
GDP each have no effect on the innovation of the Federal funds rate while they have an
effect on the innovation of M2. 
Our third model is taken from Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001; CEE
henceforth). This model includes consumption, investment, GDP, the CPI, a real wage
variable, a labor productivity measure, real corporate profits, the federal funds rate, M2
                                                
5 In the case of the euro area, we are missing an exact deflator for euro area government investment because
the ESA 95 system of national account does not require total investment to be broken down into its private
sector and public sector component. See the data appendix for an explanation of the construction of private
investment series for the euro area, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. However, for the VARs where it is
possible to experiment with both private and total investment, there are no important differences that
depend on which of these series is used.
6 See Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) for a discussion of the
changes in the Federal Reserve operating procedures. 
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consumption and investment for the consumption and investment series that they used in
order to match the euro area data (where disaggregated figures are not available).
7 Given
the substantial difference between this specification and the other two VARs we consider
this alternative particularly important.
Turning to the results, most of our main findings (aside from the composition of the
output response) are summarized in Figure 1, with each of the three panels describing one
of the models. The CEE and Erceg and Levin models are each just identified, so that the
procedure for computing confidence intervals for impulse responses is easily
implemented (Sims and Zha, 1999). The graphs report the point estimate of the impulse
response and the confidence band formed by 10
th and the 90
th percentile based on 1000
Monte Carlo simulations for 20 quarters after the initial shock.
8 In the case of the Gordon
and Leeper model, which is over-identified, the point estimates and error bands, again the
10
th and the 90
th percentiles of the simulated impulse responses, are based on the
Bayesian procedure advocated by Sims and Zha (1999).
9 We notice that the responses of
consumption and investment estimated with this procedure are more persistent and about
twice as large, as the one obtained with the other two VARs.
 
As a matter of course the confidence intervals for the second half of the sample are much
wider, so these results are in general less certain. But, despite the substantial differences
across the VAR specifications, two consistent findings emerge from our analysis of
monetary policy shocks. First, the impulse responses clearly show that following an
innovation in the funds rate, output declines within one or two quarters and reaches its
peak decline within four to eight quarters.
10 The responses are such that the decline is
significantly different than zero around the peak (and this is true even for the short
sample). The standard errors grow as the horizon extends beyond two years, so that
precise statements are not warranted, but we cannot reject the proposition that output is
back at its baseline five years after the shock in almost all of the cases. 
The second consistent finding is that price responses are more sluggish than the output
responses. Here the exact shapes are somewhat sample and model-specific. In all of the
specifications and time periods prices show little change in the first couple of quarters
after the monetary policy disturbance. In some of the specifications, prices actually rise
for more than a year after an increase in interest rates. Sims (1992) labeled this perverse
price response the price puzzle and explained it as possibly reflecting omitted variables
from the VAR that the Federal Reserve might be responding to. Subsequently Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1995), Barth and Ramey (2002) and others have suggested the
                                                
7 In CEE, consumption is defined as the sum of non-durable, services and government consumption, while
the investment they include in their VAR is the sum of gross private sector investment and durable
consumption. We thank Larry Christiano and Chris Evans for providing us their data. 
8 All the simulations were performed with Rats 5.0. The original Rats program for computing error bands
was modified to report percentiles of the simulated impulse responses instead of adding multiples of the
standard errors to the mean of the simulated impulse responses. 
9 We thank Jennifer Roush for assistance in implementing the Bayesian procedure and computing these
confidence intervals. 
10 The output responses are always recovered by summing the components.
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financing costs. For our purposes explaining this phenomenon is less relevant than noting
that the slow response of prices to policy shocks seems to be a pervasive feature of the
data. 
In the long baseline sample, the estimated responses after the first year are more in line
with standard theoretical predictions. In both the Erceg and Levin and the CEE models,
by eight to twelve quarters after the initial shock the price declines are estimated to be
significant. After that, while the uncertainty surrounding the point estimate becomes
fairly large, we typically cannot reject the hypothesis that the price level eventually
settles down to a new permanently lower level (with no long run effect on inflation). For
the Gordon and Leeper model the price level response even in the long sample is almost
always indistinguishable from zero.
  
In the other two samples, and particularly the recent sub-sample, we cannot in general
detect any statistically significant price effects from the change in monetary policy. In
most of these cases, even the point estimates suggest weak responses. Thus, we conclude
that the VAR evidence on the transmission mechanism for the U.S. is much less clear
regarding prices than output. 
Turning to the euro area, we start with an area wide analysis, using synthetic data that is
created by combining country-level macroeconomic variables to form aggregate data for
the area as a whole. The first model we consider for the area wide analysis follows the
specification proposed by Peersman and Smets (2003), and includes GDP components,
the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), M3
11, the money market interest rate
and the effective exchange rate of the euro as endogenous variables. In addition, the
model includes three U.S. variables that account for shocks to the world economy: the
index of commodity prices already used in the VAR models of the U.S., described above,
U.S. GDP and the federal funds rate. These three variables are exogenous. The monetary
policy shock is identified by a Choleski decomposition, with the variables ordered as
above. We report estimates for two samples: 1970-2000, the longest available sample
period and for 1980-2000, which starts with the beginning of the European Monetary
System (EMS).
12
We also report a second version of the Peersman and Smets (2003) model without M3.
We consider this alternative for two reasons. First, monetary aggregates were not as
prominent in the European central banks’ monetary policy strategy in the 1970s as they
subsequently became. Second, euro area synthetic monetary aggregates have only
recently been backdated to the 1970s. Our models that include M3 for the 1970’s should
                                                
11 M3 is the natural choice among monetary aggregates given the importance it has in the monetary policy
strategy of the European Central Bank.
12 Within the EMS, countries that then belong to the European community, i.e. Belgium, France, German,
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, pegged their currency to a the ECU, a basket of their currencies.
De facto, currencies were pegged to the Deutsche-Mark in order to import the credibility of the Deutsche
Bundesbank. 
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better known.
Our third model mimics CEE for the euro area.
13 To avoid a perverse money response for
one of the two samples, we need to substitute the stock price index by the real effective
exchange rate within the model. However, this substitution does not change the effects of
monetary shocks on other variables of the model. All the specifications that we analyze
also include the time trend and other exogenous variables that Peersman and Smets
(2003) advocate. 
In order to maximize the degrees of freedom, all the results presented here are based on
models estimated with two lags.
14 In addition, the consumer price indices and the
monetary aggregates are entered as growth rates. This transformation improves the
stability of some of the impulse responses. 
Figure 2 summarizes the main findings of the three VARs which we estimated using euro
area synthetic data. The output and price responses to the identified monetary policy
shock are quite similar to what is observed for the U.S. In particular, the response of
output to the monetary policy shifts is hump shaped, with the peak occurring about one
year after the shock. Likewise, the response of prices is more gradual than the one of
output. Finally, the effects on output and on inflation are temporary. 
However, in contrast with the U.S. estimates, the uncertainty of the responses does not
fall when the sample is extended prior to 1980. This is one indication of the instability
amongst these European economies in the 1970s.
As a robustness check we also analyze a similar set of VARs for France, Germany, Italy
and Spain, which together account for 80 percent of the euro area GDP. Our goal in doing
so is to verify that the use of the synthetic data is not masking any obvious patterns that
would be present at the country-level. To do so we update the Mojon and
Peersman (2003) VARs for these four countries. We include in the VAR the breakdown
of GDP into its main components as was done for the U.S. and with the euro area
synthetic data.
15 
The sample period runs from the first quarter of the 1980, when the European Monetary
System started, to 2001 – so that it coincides with our short sample for the model
estimated with euro area synthetic data. However, given all of the shocks that hit the
EMS we recognize that identifying monetary policy shocks in this short sample is
difficult. A full set of robustness checks for these results would take us too far astray. But
because the findings are in line with the more comprehensive analysis conducted with
                                                
13 The additional variables relative to the Peersman and Smets model are productivity, profits, workers’
compensation.
14 The pattern of responses are however quite similar with either 3 of 4 lags in most cases.
15 Two other differences with Mojon and Peersman is that we use private investment instead of total
investment and that we extend the sample period to include the first three years of the monetary union. See
the appendix for further details.
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VAR based approach suggests about the transmission mechanism in these countries.
Thus, we see these results as another independent way to check whether our findings with
euro area synthetic data are accidental.
 
The results are shown in Figure 3, with one panel for each country. In general the
country-level results are qualitatively similar to the findings for the area as a whole. But
quantitatively the responses of consumption and GDP are even weaker than in the area-
wide data and are almost never significantly different from zero. In the case of Germany,
consumption remains above baseline for three quarters after the initial shock. Also,
investment appears less persistent at the country level than at the euro area level –
although these responses typically are significant after the first year. Finally, prices adjust
gradually downward in Italy, Spain and France but they hardly deviate from the baseline
in Germany. 
Overall, we read the evidence from the countries as confirming the area wide findings
and showing that both are broadly consistent with the consensus view on the effects of
monetary policy in the U.S.
2.3 Transmission Estimates from Large Scale Models
We now look at an alternative characterisation of the monetary transmission, that
provided by large-scale “structural” macro-econometric models. Relative to VARs, these
models incorporate vastly different information sets and modelling priors, hence a
rigorous comparison may look impossible. Nonetheless, it is precisely this difference that
we regard as potentially informative. If each of these two sets of models incorporate, to
some extent, essential features of the data and of the correctly identified transmission
mechanism, then findings that are robust across the two may be particularly reliable, as
they do not depend on arbitrary modelling choices. In this sense, after having examined
several benchmark VARs we view the contrast between these and structural models as
more informative, at the margin, than further comparisons amongst alternative VARs. 
We consider two sets of model results. The first, for the U.S., comes from simulations of
the Federal Reserve Board’s macroeconomic model of the U.S. economy (FRB/US).
16
Ludvigson, Steindel and Lettau (2002) report some comparisons of how policy rate
changes in this model compare to predictions made by the Washington University
Macroeconomic Model and the Data Resources International model. Along the
dimensions that we emphasize it appears that these three models are relatively similar.   
The euro area results are obtained from two sources. The first is an euro-area wide model
(AWM) developed by the ECB staff (Henry, Fagan and Mestre, 2001 and Dieppe and
Henry, 2002), estimated on synthetic data. The second is an aggregation of results from
national models developed by the national central banks (NCBs; see van Els et al., 2001).
                                                
16 We thank Flint Brayton and Chris Erceg for providing these results to us. The simulations are run with
the standard version of the model in which expectations are based on VAR forecasts; see Reifschneider,
Tetlow, and Williams (1999) for a full description of the model and its properties.
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country (in which the intra-area exchange rates are fixed). Likewise a harmonised
treatment of long-term interest rates and exchange rate was imposed. Thus, the simulation
is intended to crudely approximate the conditions that would prevail in a currency union.
The specific interest rate path that is considered is an 8-quarter increase in the money
market rate (the fed funds rate in the U.S. case) by 100 basis points (b.p.). The long term
interest rate and the exchange rates were respectively assumed to move according to the
expectations hypothesis and the uncovered interest parity condition. Specifically, the
exchange rate initially appreciates by 2% and then gradually returns to baseline over 2
years; the long-term rate adjusts up immediately, by about 20 b.p., and gradually returns
to baseline. While the nature of the experiment conflicts with the Lucas policy regime
invariance criterion (since the model coefficients are assumed unchanged), we still
believe that it is informative for the small, temporary shock that is envisaged.
The left panel of Table 2 reports results on the U.S.
17 These results are quite similar to
those obtained from the VARs in terms of the reactions of prices, output, and the
components of output. In particular, output and consumption responses are hump-shaped
with a maximum decline at the beginning of year 3, while investment keeps falling all the
way through the third year. Prices are virtually unchanged for the first four quarters after
the tightening. From year one onward prices fall steadily for the next two years. Thus, the
relatively slower response of prices compared to output that was observed in the VARs is
also present in the FRB/US simulations.
 
The right hand side of Table 2 reports the euro area simulations. Again, despite the
methodological differences, the effects on output and on prices are qualitatively similar to
the outcome of the VAR models of the euro area. The hump-shaped response of GDP
(which begins moving back to the baseline from year 4 in the AWM) and the gradual
response of prices also matches the results obtained for the U.S. Robustness across
models may suggest that the results reflect underlying features of the data. Moreover,
these results are broadly consistent with the pattern observed at the national level in the
NCBs model based simulations, at least in qualitative terms.
18 
3. Evidence on the composition of output response
The composition of the output response has attracted much less attention than the size
and timing of the overall GDP and price responses discussed above (with the notable
exceptions of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Erceg and Levin (2002)). Yet, whether
consumption or investment responds more, or more quickly, to a monetary tightening is
an issue of clear importance in the policy debate and in welfare analyses.
 
                                                
17 The results we describe here are very close to the ones (not reported) obtained when following an initial
shock, the funds rate evolves according to a Taylor rule, i.e. so that it depends on the gap between
inflation and the target rate of inflation and the output gap. 
18 For a detailed presentation of these results see van Els et al. (2003). 
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(monetary policy induced) change in each demand component and the total change,
obtained as the sum of the changes of the various components.
19 In particular, we focus
on consumption and investment, computing what we term their contributions to the
response of the private sector domestic demand (PSDD) – the sum of consumption plus
investment. We view this normalization as a way to minimize the importance of the
shortcut that we took in modeling the rest of GDP in the VARs. Also, it allows a direct
comparison with the results obtained in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models assessed in the next section of the paper, where only consumption and investment
are modeled.
20 In what follows we consider cumulative changes, in order to smooth out
some of the noise that can be present in the responses (particularly in the first periods).
21
Despite this smoothing there are a few cases where the estimated contributions in these
first few periods are rather unstable. This will occur whenever the overall response of
PSDD to the monetary policy shock is initially close to zero. 
A major advantage of the contribution measures is that they are unit-free statistics that
can be compared across models and countries, thus sidestepping the problems of
comparability among VARs and structural models. This is because, by focusing on a
comparison of how much investment or consumption move relative to PSDD following a
given policy shift, the nature of the shift that moves both the components to be compared
is in general less relevant. One exception to this is when the persistence of the policy shift
is significantly altered. However, this is unlikely to be the case for the kind of shifts that
are considered throughout the paper. 
In the upper half of Table 3, we report the estimated contributions based on the U.S.
VAR models.  The table shows the median contribution along with the 10
th and 90
th
percentiles of 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. In the lower half of the table we report the
point estimates for the FRB/US model. Table 4 reports analogous figures for the euro
area VARs and structural models.  
Rather than discuss the many potential comparisons between the Table 3 and Table 4
estimates, we combine the simulations from the different VARs to form one complete set
of estimated contributions for each economy. This means that the U.S. distribution is
based on 9000 simulated draws (three models, over the three samples), while the euro
area distribution is based on 6000 simulated draws (three models, with two samples). The
three panels in Figure 4 show the pair of distributions at three horizons (quarters 4, 8, and
                                                
19 If the model is specified in a log-linear form, we recover the contribution as follows: we first take the
ratio of the responses of the consumption and investment to the response of GDP, each relative to baseline
(these are then semi-elasticities); we multiply these two ratios by the shares of consumption and investment
in GDP, respectively; we normalize the results so that they add up to one. In particular, for the euro area we
used the average consumption and investment shares over the 1970 to 2000 period, 0.60 and 0.186.For the
U.S. we used the average shares from 1960 to 2001, 0.66 and 0.15 respectively. 
20 In addition, given that in this metric, the contribution of investment and the contribution of consumption
add up to 1, we will report only the contribution of consumption for the sake of space.
21 Note that cumulating up to time t the responses to a one-off shock occurring in t-k can also be interpreted
as observing, at time t, the response to a shock sustained from t-k to t; the latter is the measure we will
adopt when looking at structural macroeconometric models. 
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from the large scale models.  
Figure 4 provides the basis for our assertion that there is an output composition puzzle. It
is apparent from the figure that the size of the consumption contributions in the two
economies is quite different. The difference is significant in both economic and statistical
terms. For instance, focusing on the VARs one would conclude that the difference in the
medians of the distributions is 32 percentage points at 4 quarters, and remains above 13 at
12 quarters. A formal Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of two distributions
rejects the hypothesis of equality (at a significance level well below one percent at each
of the three horizons). 
Another way to see the large difference between the VAR estimates for the contributions
is to examine the cumulative distributions of these data. At the four quarter horizon, more
than 2/3 of the euro area simulated consumption contributions are below 0.4. In contrast,
only about five percent of the U.S. simulated contributions are below 0.4. At the twelve
quarter horizon, 86% of the simulated euro area consumption contributions are below 1/2,
while only 41% of the U.S. contributions are below 1/2. 
Importantly, these large differences are not tied to using VARs, they are also apparent in
the implied contributions coming from the large-scale models. The FRB/US model
implies much larger consumption contributions than do the U.S. VARs and all euro area
structural models. For instance, the point estimates from the FRB/US model and, for the
euro area, the aggregation of the national models consistently show differences in
consumption contributions on the order of 30 percentage points.
Given its structural nature, for the FRB/US model it is relatively easy to understand why
consumption adjustments are so important. A key part of the transmission mechanism in
the model is that changes in the federal funds rate move long term rates that lead to
changes in the value of the stock market. Consumption is estimated to strongly respond to
the change in wealth (see Reifschneider, Tetlow and Williams, 1999). These wealth
effects are also quantitatively significant in the Washington University Macroeconomic
model and the Data Resources Incorporated model.  To the contrary, the effect of stock
market prices on wealth and subsequently on consumption is not a prominent feature of
the structural models for the euro area (see van Els et al., 2003).
As a further cross-check against Figure 4 we also compute the consumption contributions
implied by the VARs for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The top panel in Table 5
displays the contributions (median, 10
th and 90
th percentiles) that correspond to the VAR
results shown in Figure 3. The second panel shows the contributions from the country-
level structural models – together with similar calculations for the smaller countries in the
euro area, these aggregate to the “NCB” findings shown in tables 2 and 4. 
The noise in the underlying VARs carries over to the contribution statistics, so the
individual confidence intervals in Table 5 are wide. But when we combine the results
from the four countries a clearer picture emerges. Figure 5 shows this combined
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aggregate data. Conceptually these two sets of contribution estimates are not equivalent
because we have not aggregated the country-level results (and because these are only four
of the twelve euro area countries). As explained above, a major reason for cross-checking
area-wide results with the country-level evidence was precisely to avoid the aggregation
problems arising from the lack of a common monetary policy. Despite the underlying
differences between the two distributions, we find them interesting in two respects. First,
the contributions from these four major European countries do show investment
contributions to be dominant. For instance, even at the 12 quarter horizon, sixty percent
of the consumption contributions are less than ½. Secondly, the combined country-level
distribution shows consistently lower consumption contributions than are found in the
U.S. VARs.     
Finally, the national structural model (point) estimates also confirm the larger role of
investment contributions, except for France. It should be noted that the investment
demand equation of the Banque de France model did not include a proxy for the user cost
of capital at the time when this simulation exercise was performed.
22 Thus, it is not
surprising that the investment contribution in France according to this model was so low.
While there are undoubtedly more subtleties to the country-level findings than our
discussion suggests, it nonetheless seems safe to conclude that the country-level results
and those for the area as a whole are broadly consistent. It appears that in both cases the
investment contributions are, relative to consumption contributions, substantially larger
than in the U.S. 
A full investigation of the contributions across other economies is outside of the scope of
this paper. We note in passing that there are a couple of other pieces of evidence on this.
We estimated a VAR for the U.K. and found that consumption contributions there were
larger even than in the U.S (results are available on request). Conversely, Fujiwara (2003)
estimates a set of VARs for Japan and finds that investment contributions there are much
larger than consumption contributions. We look forward to further work aimed at
establishing the output composition in other countries, but for the remainder of this paper
we focus on the differences between the euro area and the U.S. 
4. Interpreting the differences in the composition of output effects
Our starting point is to check whether we can replicate the different compositions by
appropriately choosing the parameters in small scale dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models otherwise calibrated to fit the main features of the
transmission mechanisms of the two economies. In this way, we should be able to trace
the observed compositional differences back to an (hopefully small) set of differing
structural features of the economies. These, in turn, could be checked against independent
evidence, to arrive at a reasonably robust interpretation of our finding. Before embarking
in this task, we quickly review the basic structure of this class of models. 
                                                
22 The large response of investment to monetary policy shock is also a feature of Mojon and Peersman
(2003) estimations.
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Starting with the seminal works of Yun (1996), King and Wolman (1996), Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), a growing body of literature has focused on extending the basic
real business cycle model to include a number of “real world” rigidities in order to
account for some of the features of the data that the basic RBC model was unable to
match. In this task, the main challenge was to remain firmly grounded in the optimizing
behavior of a small set of rational, forward looking representative agents (a consumer, a
firm, possibly a financial intermediary, plus of course a government or a central bank),
but to incorporate a rich enough set of constraints limiting their decisions to fit the data.
The constant challenge is to do all this while retaining numerical, if not analytical,
tractability. 
The challenge was met, with success, by skillfully combining four key ingredients. The
first is a specification of the technology and of the market structure, originally due to
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). This assumption allows for product differentiation that is also
compatible with aggregation, so that overall economy-wide prices and quantities can be
constructed.
23 
The second critical ingredient is the assumption that prices and wages are set in the
fashion proposed by Calvo (1983). This price and wage setting assumption, coupled with
the assumed availability of a rich enough set of insurance markets, makes individual
firms’ prices (and wages) sticky and this stickiness carries over to the aggregate levels of
wages and price. One major advantage of this modeling strategy is that aggregate levels
can be computed without having to keep track of all possible histories of previous pricing
decisions.
24 
The final two ingredients are a clever technique of log linearization around a non-
stochastic steady state equilibrium and the use of efficient solution techniques for linear,
rational expectation models. The (solved) theoretical model has then been matched with
the data, combining calibration, matching of (selected) moments or, more ambitiously,
full maximum likelihood (cum Kalman filtering) estimation. Particularly good examples
of what can be achieved along this route are, for the U.S., the model developed by
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001; CEE) and, for the euro area, the model
developed by Smets-Wouters (2002). Very recently the latter model has been estimated
also for the U.S. (Smets-Wouters, 2003; SW), and we will use these estimates in what
follows to try develop an interpretation of differences in the composition of the output
response.
25 We will also mention some results, obtained by Lindé (2003), with the CEE
model. 
                                                
23  The aggregator is however of a CES nature, and therefore differs from the linear aggregator that
underlies National Income and Product Accounts data.
24 In particular, it is the assumption that firm (households) can fully insure against the possibility to not
being able to optimally set their price (wage) that makes that possibility a matter of irrelevance as far as the
wealth of different agents is concerned, and therefore allows for an history-independent description of the
economy developments.
25 We are very grateful to Frank Smets and Raf Wouters for providing us with the model code. 
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models they both embody a number of notable features aimed at improving the fit. First,
together with the so-called Calvo adjustment for prices and wages, an assumption is made
of full (in CEE) or partial (in SW) indexation to previous period inflation for those agents
that are not allowed to optimally re-set their price (wage). This introduces inertia in the
inflation process, a key feature of the data that a purely forward-looking formulation is
unable to match. 
Second, firms can optimally choose the intensity with which they use installed capital.
Increasing (or decreasing) the utilization rate is not costless, and the firm balances the
benefit of a marginal increase with its cost. Allowing capital services to be elastic, and in
particular to fall after a monetary policy tightening, has the consequence of muting
fluctuations in the (future) rental rate of capital, thereby helping to generate the gradual
price response observed in the data; moreover, it also reduces the increase in labor
productivity that would otherwise occur, thus offsetting the real effect of the tightening.
Third, consumers exhibit habit formation (in SW the habit formation takes an “external
form”, where the “habit” is provided by aggregate consumption, outside the control of the
single household; in CEE, instead, the habit is proportional to the household own past
consumption). This feature of the model is needed to get a gradual and hump shaped
response of consumption to a monetary impulse (observed in the data above). Indeed, the
concavity of the utility function implies that a rise in the real interest rate (a fall in the
price of future, relative to present consumption), should be associated with low current
consumption relative to the future, i.e. with a counterfactually front loaded response of
consumption to the shock. Habit formation in essence makes the argument of the utility
function to be (roughly) the growth rate of consumption, rather than its level. With this
specification the hump shaped response of consumption observed in the data after an
interest rate increase is a consequence of the desire to make the growth rate low (more
negative) today relative to tomorrow. 
Fourth, changing the stock of capital (i.e. investing) involves a cost (of course, above the
price to be paid for the new machines). The role of the adjustment cost, much like the
assumption of habit formation in consumption, is to prevent a front loaded response of
investment. In particular, any shock (including the types of monetary policy ones
considered above) that generates persistent changes in real interest rates, will engender
(absent adjustment costs) a substantial and immediate drop in investment. Adjustment
costs, modeled as penalizing the change in investment, prevent this counterfactually large
and immediate response. 
While these four features do not exhaust the richness of the two models, they are
arguably what enable them to match many features of the empirical transmission
mechanism much better than plain vanilla RBC models do. 
 
It is probably too early to judge whether these models, and more generally DSGE models
will live up to the challenge of replacing the more traditional large scale econometric
models in use by many decision makers and practitioners. DSGE models certainly have a
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econometric findings that still adequately fit the data. However, these models have some
limitations that might complicate their use in trying to explain our puzzle. In particular,
the DSGE models typically assume the availability of a complete set of markets, thus
making it difficult to generate precautionary behavior or liquidity constraints that might
affect the consumption response to changes in the monetary policy stance. Related to this,
we don’t know of a DSGE that can explain the different historical patterns of financial
market developments. This is one of the most striking differences between the U.S. and
the euro area that might have a bearing on the observed differences in the composition of
the output response to monetary policy. It is also worth recalling that the representative
agent nature of these models makes them liable to potential pitfalls resulting from
aggregation problems (see Kirman, 1992, and Altissimo, Siviero and Terlizzese, 2002),
whose actual importance still needs to be assessed. 
Nonetheless, we believe these models are rich enough to provide us with an organized
way to interpret the evidence. In particular, they have a number of features — both
pertaining to short-run frictions and to long-run equilibrium properties — which make
them potentially suitable for identifying the determinants of the puzzle. 
4.2 Examining the output composition in the SW model 
We use the SW model to address three questions. First, are there identifiable mechanisms
that are in principle capable of generating a difference in the output composition in the
U.S. and euro area? Secondly, do the different estimates of the parameters of the model
for the two economies imply a difference in the output composition that is qualitatively
similar to the Section 3 findings? Lastly, are these implied differences in the output
composition quantitatively in line with the above evidence?  
To our first question the answer is a clear yes, as there are several features of the model
that could generate different output compositions. Our experimentation simulating the
model suggests however that not all of the mechanisms present in the SW model matter
for the composition of the output response. We determined that out of the large number
of parameters estimated, only 5 parameters makes any material difference for the implied
consumption contributions (in the wake of a shock to short term interest rates) at horizons
up to 12 quarters after the initial shock. 
Four of these five parameters govern fairly intuitive economic mechanisms. The first of
these determines the size of investment adjustment costs. Higher values of this parameter
damp investment responses and hence yield relatively larger consumption contributions.
In light of these adjustment costs transitory changes in user cost of capital will have
limited effects. This means that the parameter in the central bank’s reaction function that
measures the amount of interest rate smoothing is also important. 
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rate, the larger are the predicted investment responses.
26 A third key parameter measures
the strength of the habit persistence in consumption. When habit persistence is stronger,
then the adjustment in consumption following an interest rate shock is smaller. Finally,
the level of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is also relevant. When consumers
have high willingness to shift consumption over time, a given interest rate change will
engender larger consumption responses. 
In addition to these behavioral parameters, the share of capital in the (long-run) Cobb-
Douglas production function matters. The mechanisms associated with this parameter are
less intuitive, and somewhat more mechanical. The stability of the model requires the
capital to output ratio to be restored (eventually) after all shocks. This means that the
long-run movement in investment must move in proportion to the long-run change in
output. The Cobb-Douglas parameter therefore has two influences on the contributions.
First, it matters because it plays a role in the initial steady state level of capital to output
that is in place at the start of any simulation.  Second, in the wake of any shock the shape
of the investment response is left open but the total amount of adjustment is constrained
by the Cobb-Douglas parameter. In particular, for an economy with a relatively high
capital to output ratio, more investment adjustment must occur for any given change in
the level of output. 
Given that the model can in principle generate different output compositions, we next ask
whether this in fact occurs for the (modal) point estimates presented in SW.
27 Our answer
is a qualified yes. It turns out that the implied consumption contributions do differ in a
way that qualitatively matches the patterns found in the data. However, this does not
appear to result from the more intuitive, behavioral channels discussed above and, most
importantly, it hinges on parameter differences that are not estimated. 
The consumption contributions implied by the baseline estimates for the U.S. are, at
quarters 4, 8 and 12, respectively, equal to 0.54, 0.48, and 0.45. Those in the euro area are
instead 0.48, 0.40, and 0.36. 
The mechanisms that drive this result do not depend on the intuitive channels because
they tend to offset each other. The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is estimated to
be lower in the euro area, and the persistence in the monetary policy reaction function
higher, both features implying relatively lower consumption contributions there (as it is
in the data). Conversely, the adjustment cost parameter is estimated to be larger in the
euro area, and the habit formation parameter smaller, both features implying relatively
higher consumption contributions (contrary to what observed in the data). Besides
working in opposite directions, the quantitative differences in these four parameters are
                                                
26 This is the one exception to our earlier claim about the robustness of the contribution statistics, since
changes in this persistence parameter can correspond to very different experiments that need not be
comparable. The intuition given above that presumes that persistence increases the importance of
investment (implicitly relative to consumption) depends on investment being more interest sensitive than
consumption. This is true for the baseline SW parameter estimates.   
27 Since their estimation procedure is not explicitly geared at reproducing this specific dimension of the
data, this need not be the case.
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deviation different between the two economies. 
While these channels largely cancel, the ones tied to the Cobb-Douglas parameter do not.
In the SW model this parameter is however not estimated, but instead is fixed so that it,
along with the subjective discount rate and depreciation rate (assumed equal in the two
economies) implies a steady state value of the ratio of investment to output that matches
its observed sample average. To this end, the value of the capital share in the euro area is
set to be higher (0.30 vs. 0.24 in the U.S.). As a result, the model is hard-wired to deliver
larger long run investment responses in the euro area. This constraint is however unlikely
to be relevant within the 12 quarter horizon that we consider: the long run responses only
tend to prevail much later, between 10 and 15 years after the initial shock.  But the short
run values of the contributions are proportional to the starting capital to output levels.
Thus, if the semi-elasticity of investment to the interest rates is similar in the two
economies, then the amount of overall investment (and the investment contributions we
compute) will be higher in the euro area. It turns out that the semi-elasticities generated
by the model are indeed similar — at least up to quarter 8 — but because of different
assumed initial conditions these similarities lead to bigger investment contributions and
lower consumption contributions in the euro area. 
We now turn to our last question, is there quantitative consistency between the model
generated and the observed differences in the output composition? Our answer is, not
really. The consumption contributions implied by the point estimates mentioned above
already show that the differences, though of the right sign, are not nearly as large as those
documented in Section 3. To arrive at a more systematic and robust assessment, we
conducted a Monte Carlo exercise identical to the earlier ones done for the VARs: this is
done by drawing the full set of estimated parameters 1000 times from the posterior
distribution and computing the implied consumption contributions at the 4, 8, and 12
quarter horizons. We also re-estimated the VARs over the 1974 to 2001 period (because
the SW parameters were estimated over this period). The resulting distributions for the
SW model and the VARs are shown in Figures 6 (for the euro area) and 7 (for the U.S.).
28
Figure 7 shows that drawing from the estimated distribution of the parameters for the
U.S., the SW model generates a distribution of contributions that is relatively close to that
based on the VARs, at least at a 12 quarters horizon. But Figure 6 shows that a similar
experiment for the euro area yields distributions rather different from those based on
VARs – the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (at all three horizons) reject the equality of these
distributions at significance levels below 1 percent. 
When instead we take as a benchmark the point estimates of the contributions derived
from the structural models (see Table 3 and 4), these are close to the contributions
implied by the point estimates of the DSGE model for the euro area (or to the median of
                                                
28 The median consumption contributions of the model generated distributions in the U.S. are, at quarters 4,
8 and 12, respectively, equal to 0.57, 0.51, and 0.48, those in the euro area are 0.50, 0.42, and 0.37. These
values are close to those reported above in the text, based on the point estimates.
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for the U.S. are far off of the point estimates from the FRB/US model. 
All in all, the differences in the estimated parameters do not appear able to generate
differences in the contributions as large as those observed in the data.  Depending on
whether one compares the SW model to the large scale models or the VARs, it is possible
to get the SW model to work for one economy or the other, but not both.   
A different way to see this challenge is to ask how big the estimated parameter
differences would have to be in order to generate substantial differences in the implied
contributions coming from the model. We need relatively large changes in any of the
relevant parameters to generate contributions that are close enough to what observed in
the data. For example, if we want the model to generate point estimates of the
contribution that are roughly equal to the median of the VAR distribution for the euro
area (something around 0.25 at each of the 3 horizons), we need to reduce (relative to the
model’s baseline) the adjustment cost parameter by more than 4 times its estimated
standard error, or the intertemporal elasticity of substitution by almost 4 times;
29
alternatively, we need to increase the habit formation parameter by about 6 times its
standard error, or the persistence in the policy reaction function by about 5 times.
30 
It is interesting to note that Lindé (2003), estimating the CEE model for both the euro
area and the U.S., seems to be able to account for the different patterns in the output
composition. The estimation procedure adopted by Lindé, in line with the approach
originally followed by CEE (2001), is less ambitious than that pursued by Smets and
Wouters, as it simply tries to match the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock.
Therefore, since the output composition that we are trying to reproduce is a feature of
those impulse responses, Lindé’s result is not really surprising.
It should be noted, however, that the changes in the parameter estimates obtained by
Lindé are quite large. In particular, the parameter capturing adjustment costs in
investment is, according to Lindé’s estimates, 13 times smaller in the euro area relative to
the U.S. (there are also other big changes, but we believe they are not really important for
the ability of the model to reproduce the output composition pattern). We see these
differences as implausibly large. 
Summing up, we conclude that the mechanisms at play in the most recent generation of
DSGE models that might potentially account for the output composition puzzle
(adjustment costs in investment decisions, habit formation, interest rate smoothing, or
willingness to substitute present for future consumption) do not provide a fully
satisfactory explanation. Therefore, we believe it is appropriate to explore further the set
of potential explanations of the output composition puzzle, relaxing the constraints posed
by this version of the models.  
                                                
29 Both the mentioned changes generate about the right contribution at quarter 8 and 12, but yield too large
a contribution at quarter 4. 
30 Even this change, which makes autoregressive component in the policy rate very close to 1, is not enough
to match the observed contributions.
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Our analysis of section 3 was based on “contributions” precisely because we viewed
these measures as being relatively robust across models and definitions of monetary
policy shocks.  But a drawback of the contribution statistic is that by being a ratio it does
not allow us to identify whether the consumption contributions are higher in the U.S.
because U.S. consumers respond more than euro area consumers to a monetary policy
shock, or whether because U.S. firms vary their investment less. To identify this we need
to look at the levels of the responses. These are difficult to compare. Nevertheless, we
argue that several pieces of evidence suggest that consumption is more likely to be at the
root of our puzzle. Next, we will offer some preliminary conjectures as to why
consumption might be more responsive to a monetary policy shock in the U.S. 
We start by examining the structural model simulations. In these models one can easily
trace the effects of the same exogenous interest rate (and exchange rate) path on all the
variables in the model, including consumption and investment, and compare the results.
While this experiment has the weakness of suspending the policy reaction functions, at
least it allows for a neat comparison. These simulations suggest that investment responses
are surprisingly similar. In the FRB/US model the drop is about 0.3% relative to the
baseline value in the first year, about 1.8% in the second year, about 3.1% in the third. In
the euro area models the drop is in the range 0.3% to 0.8% in the first year, 1% to 2.4% in
the second, 1.2% to 3% in the third (see Table 2).
In contrast, there appear to be large differences in the response of consumption to the
policy rate shifts. In the FRB/US model the drop is about 0.4% of the baseline value in
the first year, about 1.4% both in the second and third years; in the euro area models the
drop is in the range 0.1% to 0.3% in the first year, 0.2% to 0.6% in the second, 0.2% to
0.5% in the third. 
Turning next to the VARs, the estimated profile of the investment response to monetary
shocks is rather similar in both areas, with the drop peaking about one and half years after
the shock and a gradual return to baseline afterwards. Once the differences in the size of
the initial shock are broadly taken into account, the magnitude of the (maximum) drop is
also roughly similar. For example, for the two CEE 2001 specifications (using the longest
samples), the maximum drop is slightly bigger than 1% in the U.S., after an initial
interest rate shock equal to 0.7; as compared to about 0.75%, following an initial interest
rate shock equal to 0.4 for the euro area version. 
The VARs also seem to show quantitative differences in consumption responses to a
monetary shock. The point estimates for all three euro area models display a mild-
humped shape pattern, but the standard errors suggest that the responses are typically not
different from zero. The ninety percent confidence intervals in the long sample typically
suggest that the biggest response would be no more than -0.3. For the U.S., the
consumption responses are significantly different from zero and the point estimates for
the peak responses for all three models in the long sample all exceed -0.25. 
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the investment response, instead pointing to consumption differences as the most likely
"culprit". We therefore proceed by considering explanations for why consumption in the
two economies might respond differently to a monetary policy shock. 
4.4 Alternative explanations for the consumption differences
One class of explanations that appears intuitively appealing focuses on the relative
degrees of social insurance in the euro area vs. the U.S. In particular, the availability of
complete insurance that is assumed in the DSGE model that we have examined limits the
extent with which issues pertaining to, for example, precautionary saving in the face of
employment or labor income risk can be explored. Yet, most of the literature suggests
that this is a source of major differences in the structure of personal incentives in the two
economies. It is natural to think that this element should affect consumer behavior, as it is
believed to affect e.g. labor supply.  Hence we see mechanisms that involve insurance
markets incompleteness as a natural avenue for exploration, and we focus on this in the
final section of the paper.  
We examine a selected number of potential mechanisms that could give rise to the
observed differences. Our first candidate focuses on potential effects of labor market risk
in the two economies, focusing specifically on unemployment. The permanent income
theory of consumption suggests focusing upon the (average) cumulative effect of the
shock, so that besides the short run or peak effects, the duration of any labor market
adjustments will matter. This complicates the task because we believe most prior work
suggests that there is more (unconditional) short run unemployment risk in the U.S., but
that the risk of a long spell is larger in Europe.
31 We proceed by examining the mean
effects of unemployment of monetary shocks as implied by both the VARs and the
structural models. 
The results obtained from the central banks structural models support the idea that
unemployment spells are more likely to result from a monetary policy shock in the U.S.
In the FRB/US unemployment increases by 0.12 percentage points in the first year, by
0.56 in the second and by 0.77 in the third; in the euro area models the increase is in the
range 0.04 to 0.08 percentage points in the first year, 0.11 to 0.36 in the second, 0.17 to
0.61 in the third (see Table 2). 
The VAR evidence suggests otherwise. This evidence is compiled by adding
unemployment to the models we used earlier as an extra variable, without changing the
identification procedure for the monetary shocks. Table 6 shows the results for the Erceg
and Levin model and the Peersman-Smets model without M3 for the long sample periods
— the results for other models and sample periods are similar. For both VARs
unemployment is hardly estimated to change in response to a monetary shock (with effect
being less than 0.1 percentage points at all horizons for both models.) 
                                                
31 For instance, Bean (1994) shows that transitions probabilities both in and out of unemployment are larger
in the U.S. than in Europe.
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based on differences in labor market risk in the two economies cannot be confirmed. The
issue remains open until further evidence is available. Meanwhile, we explore other
possible alternatives.
A closely related possibility is that the combination of more generous unemployment
benefits, national health care systems, generous, pay-as-you-go pension schemes, all help
to insulate euro area residents more from adverse economy wide shocks than Americans.
For example, Martin (1996) compares benefit replacement rates (net of housing and
taxes) for households of varying family-size across the U.S. and European countries.
Roughly speaking, the replacement rates in most European countries are at least twice as
high in the first year of unemployment as in the U.S. and five to ten times higher in
subsequent years. The latter result is due to the U.S. benefits dropping sharply after the
first year, so that most families could not expect to recover even 15% of their income.
However, while evidence suggests that social protection is higher in the euro area, market
protection, either in the form of straight insurance markets or in the form of risk sharing
transfers taking place among regions, is arguably bigger in the U.S. In fact, the typical
finding from the literature on risk sharing (e.g., Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha, (1996),
Sorensen and Yosha (1998), and Forni and Reichlin (1999)) is that in European countries
is low compared to the U.S.
32 
On our reading, the main focus in this literature is not on the overall amount of uninsured
risk that consumers in the two areas ultimately end up bearing —which is what matters
for our purposes—but rather on the forms and relative importance of implicit insurance
mechanisms. One result, from Forni and Reichlin (1999), suggests that the variance of
income is higher in the U.S. at business cycle frequencies, and is higher in Europe at long
run frequencies. But we are unaware of any direct studies that focus on risk sharing in the
wake of monetary policy shocks per se. 
As an admittedly indirect attempt to assess this, we look at the effect of the policy shock
on aggregate personal disposable income, both in central banks structural models and in
VARs.
Looking at central banks models, the evidence is mixed. Comparing the FRB/US model
with the aggregation of NCBs models (see Table 2), the response of disposable income to
a monetary policy shift is about the same up to the first year, but is substantially smaller
(by something between 3 and 5 times) in the euro area in the following two years.
However, if the comparison is made with the AWM, the response of disposable income is
larger in the euro area in the first year, and of the same order of magnitude in the
following two years.
The associated VAR evidence is shown in Table 6. We again show the results for the
Erceg and Levin specification for the U.S. and the Peersman and Smets model without
                                                
32 For instance, Forni and Reichlin (1999) write that "the extent of risk-sharing through capital markets and
EC structural funds is very little if comparison is made with the U.S.” 
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evidence that the response of disposable income is somewhat stronger and quicker in the
U.S. In particular, for the first few quarters, disposable income increases in the euro area,
while it falls immediately in the U.S. In terms of the cumulated response of disposable
income in the two areas, the response in the U.S. is substantially larger for the first two
years. However, the gap seems to close during the third year.
While the overall findings are somewhat ambiguous, it is striking that across models the
relative movements in consumption and disposable income in both economies following
a monetary policy shift are similar. In the euro area both the VARs and the structural
models suggest that disposable income and consumption move roughly in proportion to
each other, whereas the FRB/US model and the U.S. VARs suggest that the decline in
consumption is roughly twice the size of the decline in disposable income.
We view this finding as certainly meriting further exploration. For instance, marshalling
all available data on the components of the budget and nature of transfer programs and
checking whether these transfers effectively buffer the risk associated with a given
decline in disposable income would be an interesting next step.
33
A final possibility is that the differences in the consumption response could be due to
different wealth effects of monetary policy.  Reliable comparable data on the structure of
wealth is hard to obtain. But it is widely believed that the structure of wealth holding
differs across the two economies. For instance, total financial assets in the hands of
households were, in 2001, 321% of GDP in the U.S., 202% in the euro area (Agresti and
Claessens (2003)). Besides the tendency of Americans to hold more of their wealth in
financial securities, the form of the holdings appears to differ. The Europeans tend to
hold more government debt in their portfolios than Americans, whereas Americans hold
relatively more equity market claims and corporate debt.  But given the limited detail
available on the holdings we cannot directly measure the response of most components of
wealth to changes in interest rates. Thus, we cannot assess this channel.  
5. Conclusions
Our focus in this paper is a comparison of certain key macro-economic features of the
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy between the United States and the euro
area. After the establishment of the euro area as the largest currency area in the world,
with a new and independent central bank, a comparative understanding of the two
transmission mechanisms has, in our view, become important. Looking at them together
can not only sharpen our understanding of each and identify clues as to where and why
they differ, but also allow us to better appreciate the global implications that the
independent conduct of monetary policy in each of the two areas generates.
                                                
33 Potentially larger response of consumption relative to disposable income could be due to capital market
imperfections, if one believed that U.S. households faced more severe borrowing constraints, something
that we believe is doubtful.  
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macroeconomic time series Here the striking fact, already reported by other recent
papers, is that such properties are in fact broadly similar, suggesting that common
underlying market forces are at work.
 
Next we analyze a small set of VAR models for the two areas. We find that, again, the
main macro-economic facts are similar. Specifically, after a monetary shock, real GDP
displays a humped-shaped profile, returning to baseline, whereas the price level diverges
gradually but permanently from the initial value. Thus, the consensus on the way
monetary policy operates in the U.S. has held up through the long business cycle
expansion of the 1990s. Moreover, the consensus view seems to well describe the euro
area facts too. 
However, prior work has paid relatively little attention to the underlying adjustments that
accompany the change in output. In this respect the two areas differ. In particular, after a
change in monetary policy the role of household consumption in driving output changes
is greater, and that of investment smaller, in the U.S. relative to the euro area. This
difference is present in VAR estimates and those of large-scale structural econometric
models. We call this the “output composition puzzle”. 
To explore and explain the puzzle we take two tacks. First, we consider a class of
stochastic-dynamic-general-equilibrium models. Our main result here is that these
models, at least in the versions that are now considered on the research frontier, have
difficulty fully accounting for the puzzle. The (full information) estimates of one such
model do not quite deliver the pattern present in the data. 
Given this conclusion we turn to several less tightly structured tests and hypotheses. We
first make a tentative assessment of whether the puzzle is more likely due to divergent
behavior of consumers or firms. It appears to us that the consumers are responsible for
the differences. Unfortunately we do not have a compelling explanation for why this is
the case. It appears that disposable income may be less responsive to monetary changes
in the euro area than in the U.S. We were motivated to make this comparison by the
hypothesis that social safety net in Europe might cushion the effects of monetary policy
on consumption more there. It appears that movements in consumption relative to
disposable income are larger in the U.S. too.  Explaining this finding and sharpening the
tests of the conjecture about the importance of the social safety net are an obvious next
step. 
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Country level VARs were estimated for France, Germany, Italy and Spain, for which we
could gather, thanks to Alberto Locarno, unpublished private sector investment series.
Except for the inclusion of consumption and investment inside the VARs, these country
level VARs are quite similar to the ones presented in Mojon and Peersman (2003). 
In Germany, the VAR model includes consumption, investment, the “rest of GDP”,
inflation, the short-term interest rate and the real effective exchange rate a trend a
constant. For the other countries, we include the same variables plus the German interest
rate in order to account for the anchoring role of the Bundesbank monetary policy during
the EMS. The models are estimated for the period following the launch of the EMS, 1980
to 2001 and the identification of the French, Italian and Spanish monetary policy shocks
are performed by a Choleski decomposition, ordering the domestic money market interest
rate last. 
In the case of Germany, we solve the endogeneity bias between the interest rate and the
exchange rate innovations by imposing that a 1 percent interest rate shock triggers a
simultaneous 1 percent appreciation of the effective exchange rate. While arbitrary, this
identification assumption solves the price puzzle with a smaller appreciation than the one
obtained by instrumental variable estimation in Mojon and Peersman (2003). 
There are three other differences with the country level VARs of Mojon and Peersman
(2003). First, we ESA95 national account data and we extend the sample period by three
years, from 1999 to 2001.
34 Second, we choose the effective exchange rate variable rather
than the bi-lateral rate to the Deutsche Mark for France and for Spain. This seems more
appropriate given that the bilateral rates converged to their final parity in the second half
of the 1990‘s and then remained constant after the launch of the euro. This change of
variable was however not feasible in the case of Italy. There, we kept the Lira-Dmark
exchange rate and we included the same set of exogenous variables as the one used in the
PS model of the euro area model in order to obtain well behaved responses to interest rate
shocks, i.e. to avoid persistent price and output puzzle. Finally, we estimated the German
VAR with dummies that exclude 9 “reunification” observations, from 1990:q1 to
1992:q1. These dummies allow us to get rid of the effect of the reunification period when
interest rates, while in parallel prices and GDP also increased in a somewhat unusual
way. Mojon and Peersman (2003) managed to minimise the weight of this episode by
estimating their German VAR on a sample that also included the 1970‘s. Having the
estimates for the four countries for a sample for which we could compare the effect of
monetary policy shocks with the outcome of the VAR estimated with synthetic euro area
data seemed to us more appropriate. 
 
                                                
34 In the case of Germany, the data before 1991 were obtained by back dating the growth rates of the
ESA79 West Germany national account data.
ECB • Working Paper No 268 • September 2003 35Appendix on data
Euro area:
Most euro area time series are taken from the ECB Area Wide Model database. These
data are presented page 51 in Fagan et al. (2001). Updates of these series up to 2000q4
can be obtained from Alistair.Dieppe@ecb.int.
We use both the previously available Historical time series for M3 (February 1999
Monthly bulletin of the ECB) to conform with Peersman and Smets (2003) and the more
recent series backdated to 1970 (not yet published) for the VAR models estimated over a
sample covering the 1970s. 
The stock price, available only from 1973 onward, is the EMU-DS Market index of euro
area stocks published by Data Stream. 
Aside from the historical M3 series dating to the 1970s and the HICP, all the series we
use were already seasonally adjusted. We adjusted these remaining two series using the
seasonal adjustment routine in Eviews.
Country level data: 
We use ESA 1995 national account data for GDP and consumption. Private investment
series are obtained by subtracting public investment series from the total investment
series that are available in ESA 1995. The public investment series come from the
quarterly national account published by the statistics institutes in the case of Germany
and France. The Italian and Spanish public investment series come from Banca d’Italia
and the Banco de España. We are grateful to Alberto Locarno for providing us with these
series for the 4 countries. 
In the case of Germany, National account series prior to 1991 were backdated using
growth rate of the West German ESA79 series. 
The interest rates are the 3 months money market interest rates, which, from 1999:q1
were set equal to the euro area 3 months money market rate. The exchange rate the real
effective exchange rates and, in the case of Italy the Lira-DM exchange rate.
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Most U.S. macroeconometric time series are downloaded from www.freelunch.com. We
list the original source for the different series in turn: 
Series: Source:
GDP and all GDP components Bureau of Economic Analysis
CPI: Urban Consumer – All items, (1982-
84=100, SA)
Bureau of LS
Commodity price index KR-CRB Futures Price Index, (1967=100),
Knight-Ridder
Stock Price Index500 Composite S&P, (Index 1941-43=10, Month End)
Federal Funds Rate Federal Reserve Board: H15
10-Year Constant Maturity Securities Federal Reserve Board: H15
Total reserves and non-borrowed reserves
(adjusted for changes in
reserve requirements, Mil. $, SA)
Federal Reserve Board: Aggregate
Reserves of Depository
Institutions - H.3
M1 and M2, (SA Billions $)
 
Federal Reserve Board: H.6 Money Stock
and Liquid Assets, and Debt Measures
The private consumption series available from the BEA starts only in 1967. To arrive at a
longer time series we added the non-durable goods, durable goods and services
consumption series provided to us by Larry Christiano. He also supplied us with the real
wage and labor productivity data that we use. These series had been downloaded from
http//economics.dri-efa.com/webstract). 
Finally, the profits series corresponds to the corporate after tax profits as available in the
BIS database.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ECB • Working Paper No 268 • September 2003 43Table 6. Effects of monetary policy shocks on disposable income and unemployement 
(deviation from baseline)
      U.S.    euro area 
    Samples Samples
 Variable Horizon 1960-2001 65-79+84-01 1984-2001 1980-2000 1970-2000
Disposable income 4 quarters -0.15 -0.15 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
8 quarters -0.16 -0.04 -0.14 -0.15 -0.17
12 quarters -0.07 0.08 -0.21 -0.10 -0.18
Cumulated disposable. income 4 quarters -0.33 -0.28 -0.02 0.14 0.04
8 quarters -0.93 -0.53 -0.39 -0.32 -0.46
12 quarters -1.33 -0.38 -1.16 -0.84 -1.21
Unemployment 4 quarters 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
8 quarters 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.09
12 quarters 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.06
Notes: U.S. model is the Erceg-Levin VAR, while the euro area model is the Peersman-Smets model without M3. Authors calculation of the impulse response
function of the variables of interest in VARs presented in section 2 of the paper. Disposable income and unemployment were included after the three GDP
components in the baseline VARs.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ECB • Working Paper No 268 • September 2003 51Figure 4: Distributions of the consumption contribution in the VARs and the structural models in
the euro area (solid lines) and the U.S. (dotted lines)


















































































Note: The density curves are based on 6000 simulations for the euro area (1000 draws for each of
the two samples for each of the 3 VARs) and 9000 simulations for the U.S. (1000 draws for each
of the three samples for each of the 3 VARs). The vertical lines indicate the contributions as
obtained by the structural models.
ECB • Working Paper No 268 • September 2003 52Figure 5: Distributions of the consumption contribution calculated from the euro area aggregate
VAR (thin line) and from the combination of the individual country VARs (thick line)









































































Note: The density curves are based on 6000 simulations for the euro area (1000 draws for each of
the two samples for each of the 3 VARs) and 4000 simulations for the euro area countries (1000
draws for each of the four countries).
ECB • Working Paper No 268 • September 2003 53Figure 6: Distributions of the consumption contribution in the euro area, VARs (solid line) and
Smets-Wouters DSGE model (dashed line)









































































Note: The density curves are based on 3000 simulations for the VARs (1000 draws for each of
the 3 VARs) and 1000 simulations for Smets and Wouters model (1000 draws from the joint
distribution of the  estimated model parameters).
ECB • Working Paper No 268 • September 2003 54Figure 7: Distributions of the consumption contribution in the U.S., VARs (dotted line) and
Smets-Wouters DSGE model (dashed line)









































































Note: The density curves are based on 3000 simulations for the VARs (1000 draws for each of
the 3 VARs) and 1000 simulations for Smets and Wouters model (1000 draws from the joint
distribution of the  estimated model parameters).
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